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A BIT OF HISTORY
H OMESTEAD debt exemption is rooted in a public policy which
shelters the family against the storms of financial misfortune. It
is better business, in time of stress, to protect the home than the credi-
tors. "Home," it was wisely quoted in one Wisconsin decision, "is the
chief school of human virtue. Its responsibilities, joys, sorrows, smiles,
tears, hopes, and solicitudes form the chief interest of human life."'
Exemption in Wisconsin is as old as the state itself. A provision,
much discussed before the people of Wisconsin Territory, was incorpo-
rated in the first rejected constitution, exempting a homestead of the
debtor from forced sale by the creditor. 2 The second constitutional con-
vention, called immediately after the first constitution had been re-
jected, created a constitution which placed a mandate upon the legis-
lature in these words of the Declaration of Rights: "The privilege of
the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized
by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from
seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter con-
tracted."'3 The debtor was given a sphere of absolute legal immunity,
for the same constitution in the next preceding section prohibited im-
prisonment for debt.
1 Warsco v. Oshkosh S. T. Co., 190 Wis. 87, 208 N.W. 913 (1926).
2 See Hoyt v. Howe, 3 Wis. 752 (1854), which incorporates some homestead
history.
3 WIs. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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Pursuant to a mandate of the constitution of Wisconsin which was
adopted on March 13, 1848, the legislature passed the first homestead
law, crude in form, but well meant, reading as follows: "A homestead
(here indicating the territorial extent) shall not be subject to forced
sale on execution or any other final process from a court, for any debt
or liability contracted after the first day of January, in the year one
thousand eight hundred and forty-nine. '4
Six years after the passage of the law appeared the first case deal-
ing with its interpretation. The question presented was this: May the
lien of a judgment be enforced upon the debtor's alienation of his
homestead, or upon his ceasing to occupy it as such by his voluntary
act? The court held that it could. But Justice Smith, in an interesting
dissenting opinion, thought that such a judgment lien should not be
enforced, and stated that the statute should be liberally construed.- He
felt that if the defect of the statute could not be remedied by judicial
interpretation, the matter should be corrected by the legislature. In 1858
legislative action brought the law into conformity with the dissenting
opinion. "The owner of a homestead," read the amendment, "may re-
move therefrom, or sell or convey the same, and such removal or sale
and conveyance shall not render such homestead subject or liable to
forced sale on execution or other final process... "6
The law limiting a homestead to a value of $5000 7 was' not enacted
until 1901,8 although the abuses of an unlimited homestead exemption
were pointed out as early as 1859. In this year the case of Phelps v.
Rooney9 came to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for a decision.
Rooney, owning a building valued at about $15,000, leased a lower part
of it as a store at $1500 a year, and resided in the upper part. The
court held that there was no forfeiture of the benefit of the exemption
though the most valuable part of the building was devoted to other than
residence purposes. "Few candid persons," explained the court, "would
4 Wis. Laws 1849, c. 102.
5 Hoyt v. Howe, 3 Wis. 785, 764 (1854). "Can it be," wrote Justice Smith, "* **
that the legislature should so have arranged its details as to make the home-
stead of the unfortunate debtor his prison; that the beneficent intention of the
constitution and the law * * * was only an ingenious device to confine all the
energies of the man to the narrow limits of his homestead? * * * That there
must be forever the small center around which he must move continually * * *?
for, as soon as he should change his quarters, the fangs of a judgment lien,
held in reserve, and masked by the law, would fasten upon his home."
6 Wis. Laws 1858, c. 137.
7 Wis. STAT. (1933) § 272.20.
s Wis. Laws 1901, c. 269. This unsatisfactory condition of excessive exemption
was not peculiar to Wisconsin. Hon. H. Teichmueller in 1901 wrote in 35
Am. L. REv. 413: "Homesteads of inordinate value serve as hiding places of ill
gotten gains, and losses may be unloaded upon duped creditors. * * * A money
valuation as the basis of homestead exemption is the only effectual remedy
I can conceive."
9 9 Wis. 70 (1859).
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contend that the law was not defective, and that the grossest abuses do
not find sanction under its provisions in many cases every day. Instead
of securing to the debtor a reasonable amount of property, and a dwell-
ing house for himself and family, of limited value, we have a statute
which exempts a homestead which frequently is worth ten, twenty, or
forty thousand dollars." But the court construed the statute exactly as
it read. Justice Dixon, dissenting, referred to the possibility of holding
the law unconstitutional. However, in his opinion, it could be supported
by restricting the homestead to that part of the building occupied as a
dwelling.10
WHAT IS A WISCONSIN HOMESTEAD
Now, just what is meant by a homestead? Both statute and judicial
decision give answer to the question. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
defines it as "the land where is situated the dwelling of the owner and
family."" But what is the meaning of "land"? This is a query to which
the decisions have given an answer in substantial detail.
The homestead may be less than a fee. The statutes of Wisconsin
provide that the exemption shall extend "to any estate less than a fee
held by any person by lease, contract or otherwise."' 2 This includes an
equitable interest not amounting to a perfect title in law' 3 ; to an in-
terest represented by a contract to purchase land' 4 ; or to property
held under a lease. "It is... true," said the court in Beranek v. Beranek,
"that, in so far as leased property is susceptible of being conserved in
a home, it is governed by the same rules that apply to homesteads based
upon property held by more enduring titles."' 5
The homestead may consist of an equity in mortgaged property.
This was decided in Northwestern Securities Company v. Nelson.0
And the fact that the owner of a homestead subjects it to a mortgage
does not lessen his right against other creditors to assert the homestead
exemption to the limit provided by the statute."
Only the dwelling house and its appurtenances are exempted. This
is stated in the statute. But what is meant by "appurtenances"? It was
decided in Casselman v. Packard that no more of a lot in a city or vil-
IOPhelps v. Rooney, 9 Wis. 70 (1859). The court here pointed to the specific
wording of the constitution which made it "the privilege of the debtor to
enjoy the necessary comforts of life * * * recognized by wholesonre laws ex-
empting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale." P. 71. The
italics are his. See also Krueger v. Groth, 190 Wis. 387, 209 N.W. 772 (1926)
for a comment on pertinent legislative history.
" Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis. 635 (1862).
22 Wis. STAT. (1933) § 272.20.
13 McCabe v. Mazzuchelli, 13 Wis. 478 (1861).
-4 Chopin v. Runte, 75 Wis. 361, 44 N.W. 258 (1890).
Is Beranek v. Beranek, 113 Wis. 272, 275, 89 N.W. 146 (1902).
16 191 Wis. 580, 211 N.W. 798 (1927).
"7 Wisconsin M. & S. Co. v. Kriesel, 191 Wis. 602, 211 N.W. 792 (1927).
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lage can be held as a homestead than is actually occupied for that pur-
pose, and stores and offices erected thereon and rented by the debtor,
with the portions of the lot on which they are situated, are not exempt
from forced sale on execution.'8 In Schoffen v. Landauer19 it was stated
that if there were two dwellings or a dwelling and other buildings on
the quarter acre, one dwelling occupied as a homestead and the other
leased to tenants, the houses leased and the ground upon which they
stand are not exempt unless the rented buildings should be occupied by
servants in the employment of the owner.
The homestead must be in compact form. It was pointed out in an
early case 20 that it was not the legislative intent that the homestead
should include non-contiguous2 tracts lying distant from each other.
"If this were the meaning of the statute," said the court, "there would
be an obvious impropriety in speaking of the homestead as consisting
of any quantity of land not exceeding forty acres, and the dwelling
house thereon." The situation presented in the case of Hornby v.
Sikes22 called for the application of the principle laid down in Bunker
v. Locke. A dwelling house was on a two acre lot. Twenty-seven rods
away was a 38-acre plot. The court held that the latter parcel was not a
part of the homestead. But if the tracts of land are contiguous and are
used and occupied as a homestead, it matters not that they are not
wholly within the bounds of a legal subdivision.23
In determining the area of the homestead tract, streets are included
in the city while highways are excluded in the country. This rule is the
result of the judicial determination of legislative intention. To include
one-half the area of an abutting city street would have the effect of
greatly limiting the size of city homesteads, especially those that hap-
pened to be on the corner of intersecting streets. To apply such a rule
in the country would be unnecessary, and would lead to the practice of
adding to a government subdivision of forty acres such additional land
as would equal the abutting or transversing highways. This, the court
pointed out, could not be a proper construction of the statute. 24
1s 16 Wis. 114 (1862). A distinction is made between a horizontal and a vertical
division of property. The horizontal division was not recognized in Phelps v.
Rooney, 9 Wis. 70 (1859). Chief Justice Dixon, in a dissenting opinion, stated
that the distinction between that case and the Cassehnan case was only a differ-
ence between perpendicular and horizontal lines, a distinction he believed to be
untenable.
1960 Wis. 334, 19 N.W. 95 (1884).2 0 Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis. 635 (1862).
21 Streams or highways do not, of course, interfere with contiguity. See Binsel
v. Grogan, 67 Wis. 147, 29 N.W. 895 (1886).
2256 Wis. 382, 14 N.W. 278 (1882).
23Larson v. State Bank, 201 Wis. 313, 230 N.W. 132 (1930).




A building need not be devoted exclusively to a home in order to
have the character of a homestead. This rule was established in Phelps
v. Rooney. 25 On the authority of this case a hotel covering less than a
quarter acre was exempted, the owner occupying part of it as his dwell-
ing.2 6 The court felt that a principle to the effect that the chief use
should determine the character ofa building would have been better,
but would not undertake to abrogate a rule of such long standing.
The homestead exemption extends to the interests of tenants in
common. Section 272.20 of the statutes, to which reference has already
been made, states: "Such exemption extends to ... the interest ... of
a tenant in common or two or more tenants in common." Before this
provision of the law had been incorporated, the Supreme Court in West
v. Ward27 had said: "The law might very reasonably provide that a
homestead might be claimed in any individual interest, establishing at
the same time some mode by which it should be set apart and ascer-
tained. Perhaps such provision would be no more than the spirit of the
constitutional provision upon this subject fairly requires. But the legis-
lature has done neither, and the court cannot supply the defect, if it is
one."
Materials deposited on homestead land for the repair of the house
or appurtenant buildings are a part of it. Consequently, lath, shingles,
and lumber purchased by a debtor for the purpose of putting his home-
stead in better condition, and which are actually deposited upon the
land included in the homestead, share in the exemption.2 8
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOMESTEAD STATUTE
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has had several opportunities to
construe the homestead statute, which statute, for the purpose of this
article, is set out in part below. Construed words or phrases have been
italicized.
"A homestead to be selected by the owner thereof consisting, when
not included in any city or village, of any quantity of land, not exceed-
ing forty acres, used for agricultural purposes; and when included in
any city or village of any quantity of land not exceeding one-fourth of
an acre and the dwelling house thereon and its appurtenances owned
and occupied by any resident of this state shall be exempt from seizure
or sale on execution, from the lien of every judgment and from lia-
bility in any form for the debts of such owner to the amount in value
of five thousand dollars... "
2
.
5 9 Wis. 70 (1859).
26 Harriman v. Queens Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 71, 5 N.W. 21 (1886).
27 26 Wis. 579 (1870).2sKrueger v. Pierce, 37 Wis. 269 (1875). See also Scofield v. Hopkins, 61 Wis.
370, 21 N.W. 259 (1884).
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First of all, in keeping with the spirit of the constitutional provision
and with the policy of the homestead statute, the Supreme Court has
often reiterated the cardinal rule that the law is to be liberally con-
strued.29
Specifically, when is property "used for agricultural purposes"? In
the case of Binzel v. Grogan3 ° it appeared that all the owner did on the
premises was to keep and feed his horses. The court went on to point
out that it was to be conceded that the property was used for at least
one agricultural purpose. "But we do not think," continued the court,
"the statute should receive a literal construction. . . .The fisherman
may build his home upon the barren beach, using his land only for the
spreading of his nets and the mooring of his vessels; or the hunter may
build his home in a forest and make no use whatever of the land appur-
tenant to his dwelling except to pass over it; yet we entertain no doubt
whatever that the legislature intended.., to protect these men... "
Again, must the premises be "owned and occupied" in order to be
exempt? In Scofield v. Hopkins3l the owner had prepared the land for
a residence, had dug and curbed a well, and had placed upon the land
the stone for the foundation of his dwelling and other buildings, but
there was no dwelling house on the land and he had not occupied it
as a homestead. But the intention was definite to make the property a
homestead. The court, referring to the policy of liberal construction,
stated that "occupancy required by the statute does not mean actual
physical occupation by the owner personally .... If it is ... true that
there can be no exemption until there is a dwelling-house upon the
premises, actually occupied by the debtor personally, then it would be
almost impossible for a homeless debtor, with judgments docketed
against him, to get the benefit of the law; for the very instant he ac-
quired the title, the judgment lien would attach. Under such a construc-
tion, the only way of securing such benefit would be to select premises
with a dwelling already thereon, and then actually occupy, with the
family, prior to the acquisition. But such strict literalism would do
violence to the obvious intent of the legislature, and the whole current
of authority in this state upon this subject." The rule is then stated:
"The bona fide intention of acquiring the premises for a homestead,
without defrauding anyone, evidenced by overt acts in fitting them to
become such, followed by actual occupancy in a reasonable time, must be
29 See Krueger v. Pierce, 37 Wis. 269 (1875) ; Jarvis v. Moe, 38 Wis. 440 (1875) ;
Zinner v. Panley, 51 Wis. 282, 8 N.W. 219 (1881) ; Scofield v. Hopkins, 61
Wis. 370, 21 N.W. 259 (1884).
3067 Wis. 147, 29 N.W. 895 (1886).
3161 Wis. 370, 21 N.W. 259 (1884).
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held to give to the premises answering the description prescribed in the
statute the character of a homestead... "32
From what "debts" is there an exemption? Does this include a judg-
ment growing out of a tort action? "Although," said the court in Smith
v. Omans,3 3 "there may be a technical distinction between 'debt' and
'damages,' still the word 'debt' itself is commonly and generally used to
describe all obligations to pay money, whether arising from contract or
imposed by law as a compensation for injuries." It was the conclusion
of the court that the word was used in its general sense.
IMPAIRMENT OF THE HOMESTEAD
The provision of the statute dealing with the impairment of the
homestead reads as follows: " ... and such exemption shall not be im-
paired by temporary removal with the intention to reoccupy the same
as a homestead nor by a sale thereof. . . ,4
The meaning of "temporary removal" has come to the court for
construction on a few occasions. In the case of McDermott v. Kernan35
a widow living on the second floor of a building in which there was a
saloon and dance hall below, removed so that her children might have
a more satisfactory environment. She rented the premises and left some
furniture, with the intention of returning later, at all events when her
daughters had married. About seven years later, after she had given
an absolute deed to the property for the purpose of securing a loan, the
question arose as to the impairment of her homestead exemption right.
The court, quoting from the case of Jarvis v. Moe36 , where the authori-
ties have been extensively collected and the law stated, held her right
had not been impaired. In this case, the owner had rented his home-
stead; and owning another building in the same city had moved into
it, where he maintained a hotel. He claimed that he intended to return
to his former premises upon being able to rent or sell the hotel. As a
matter of fact the hotel did not prospe=, and a heavy incumbrance
forced a surrender. The presumption that the owner removed aninio
manendi was not rebutted by ex post facto declarations 37-- declarations
closely connected in motive and time with the failure of the hotel. The
court said, furthermore, that "The intention which is sufficient to rebut
32 See also Estate of Arndt, 199 Wis. 1, 225 N.W. 134 (1929). In this case there
was a mere mental determination to set aside a particular property as a home-
stead without any overt act. Hence there was no occupancy.
33 17 Wis. 395 (1863).34 WIs. STAT. (1933) § 272.20.
35 72 Wis. 268, 39 N.W. 537 (1888).
3638 Wis. 440 (1875).
37 See Blackburn v. Lake Shore Traffic Co., 90 Wis. 362, 63 N.W. 289 (1890),
which also points out the futility of ex post fecto professions after circum-
stances have rendered a return advantageous.
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the presumption must be positive and certain, not conditional or in-
definite." And in Moore v. Smead8 it was held that where a person
removed to another state with no certain intention of returning, but
contemplating a vague possibility, a court or jury might justifiably hold
that he had abandoned his homestead. But if there is clear evidence of
a temporary removal, the fact that one had moved to a distant state and
had voted there was not conclusive on the question of abandonment. 39
A "temporary removal" is not synonymous with what is practically
a life-long purpose. In the case of Pedersen v. Nielsen0 the owner of
homestead property in a small community was absent for eight years in
a sister state while she earned her living as a librarian, there being no
local opportunity to pursue her chosen profession. But she expected to
be absent long enough for her son to obtain both a master's and a doc-
tor's degree, to earn money to pay her debts, which were quite substan-
tial, and to provide a competency for her old age. All this would re-
quire a long and indefinite period amounting to a substantial part of a
lifetime. The Supreme Court held, contrary to the trial court, that there
was an abandonment of the homestead. "To hold otherwise," wrote
Justice Owen, "would render it difficult to visualize a situation where
continued, protracted, indefinite absence, accompanied by the exercise
of the rights of citizenship in another state, could be held to constitute
an abandonment."
JOINDER OF THE WIFE IN HOMESTEAD ALIENATION
On the subject of the alienation of a homestead, the statutes of Wis-
consin provide as follows: "But no mortgage or other alienation by a
married man of his homestead, exempt by law from execution, or any
interest therein, legal or equitable, present or future, by deed or other-
wise, with6ut the wife's consent, evidenced by her act in joining in
the deed, mortgage or other conveyance, shall be valid or of any
effect whatever, except a conveyance from husband or wife."',-
A matter closely connected with alienation is presented by the ques-
tion 4 -May the husband abandon the homestead without the wife's con-
sent? The answer was given in Beranek v. Beranek42 where it was said:
"But with all the liberality of construction, and the desire to preserve
the homestead right in its fullest fruition, there are limitations and re-
strictions surrounding it which are regarded quite potential for its de-
38 89 Wis. 558, 62 N.W. 426 (1895). See also In the Matter of the Estate of John
Phelan, 16 Wis. 76 (1862).
39 The Minnesota Stoneware Co. v. McCrossen, 110 Wis. 316, 85 N.W. 1019
(1901).
40212 Wis. 608, 250 N.W. 400 (1933).
41 WIs. STAT. (1933) § 235.01.
42 113 Wis. 272, 89 N.W. 146 (1902).
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struction. In the first place, the homestead law creates no estate in the
wife, living with the husband. It only creates a disability on the part of
the husband to alienate the homestead without her consent, evidenced by
her signature to her alienation. . . . As by his act the premises were
originally impressed with the character of a homestead, so by his act
they may be abandoned as such. The wife, from the nature of her de-
pendent relation to her husband . . . must abide the consequences of
such abandonment."
The next question which arises is this-Are there any exceptions to
the statute in this matter of alienation? The cases in Wisconsin give an
answer. Suppose a husband mortgages the homestead to his wife for
the purpose of securing a debt from the former to the latter. In such
a situation, it was held on the authority of Riehl v. Bingenheivzer'3 that
the mortgage was valid although the wife did not sign, as the statute
had no application to a conveyance of a homestead by a husband to his
wife.4 4 Where, also, a husband and wife exchanged their homestead
for another, entering into possession, the court held that the signature
of the wife was not necessary, the wife having subjected herself to the
provisions of equitable estoppel. "Although," said the court, "the con-
stitutional and legislative provisions for such exemption have been
steadfastly upheld, however far reaching the results may seem in many
instances to be found in the decisions, nevertheless the right in the wife
to invoke the protection of the statutes concerning the establishment of
or alienation of interests in the homestead is not so absolute and un-
qualified as to be beyond recognized and well established equitable doc-
trine."45 But no exception to the statute is made simply because the
wife is living apart from the husband, or because the husband, old,
infirm, and poor, mortgages the homestead in order to obtain the neces-
sities of life.
EXEMPTION OF THE HOMESTEAD PROCEEDS
It is further provided by Section 272.20 of the statutes that the ex-
emption "shall extend to the proceeds derived from such sale to an
amount not exceeding five thousand dollars, while held, with the inten-
4328 Wis. 84 (1871).
44Wochoska v. Wochoska, 45 Wis. 423 (1878).
45 Krueger v. Groth, 190 Wis. 387, 209 N.W. 772 (1926). Justice Owen wrote a
vigorous dissenting opinion. "If," he stated, "this decision does not smother
the statute requiring the wife to join in a conveyance of the homestead, then
that statute has unusual vitality. * * * The present decision points the way
to a practical nullification of this statute. Under the present decision the hus-
band may barter away a comfortable homestead, install his family in a shack
on a back alley, and upon the establishment of such second homestead-his
wife accompanying him in obedience to her plain marital duty,-the alienation
of the comfortable homestead becomes valid and the husband may dissipate
the proceeds thereof in satisfaction of his most profligate desires. Who can
deny that the public policy embodied in the statute is thereby defeated?"
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tion to procure another homestead therewith, for a period not exceed-
ing two years.
4 6
In the construction of this statute, it has been held that the use by
the debtor of a portion of thd proceeds of the homestead to pay debts
and maintain a family does not impair the exemption of the balance
which is to be used to buy another homestead ;7 and that if the home-
stead, along with other property, is encumbered by a common mortgage,
such other property will be used to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the
surplus remaining will be deemed proceeds of the sale of the homestead,
and therefore exempt.48 Furthermore, it has been decided, in keeping
with a liberal statutory interpretation, that there is no requirement that
the debtor shall continue to reside in Wisconsin during the two years,
nor that he shall intend to purchase another homestead in the state.4 9
GENERAL COMMENT
It is the purpose of this article neither to set out the complete home-
stead law of Wisconsin nor to make reference to all of the decisions of
the state which have a bearing upon its construction. Many points of
detail have therefore been intentionally omitted. The practicing attorney
who has a particular problem to solve can find completeness in the ex-
isting digests. It has been the purpose here rather to present the his-
torical background of the law, to delineate its broad underlying philoso-
phy, and, in a few bold strokes, to call attention to the nature of its
judicial construction. This will account, in part, for the generous refer-
ences to dissenting opinions. The approach is, therefore, particularly
for law school students, or for those whose practice has not been of
long standing.
48 See Bailey v. Steve, 70 Wis. 316, 35 N.W. 735 (1887).
4 Binzel v. Grogan, 67 Wis. 147, 29 N.W. 895 (1886).
48 See Hoppe v. Goldberg, 82 Wis. 660, 53 N.W. 17 (1892) ; Clancey v. Alime, 98
Wis. 229, 73 N.W. 1014 (1898).49 Hewitt v. Allen, 54 Wis. 583, 12 N.W. 45 (1882). Justice Cassoday, in a dis-
senting opinion, said: "It would seem that exemption laws, as well as all other
laws of a state granting special benefits, are presumptively for those within
the state, and not those who are citizens and permanent residents of other
states."
